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The Contribution of Non-Physical Resources and Strategic Household Decision-making to 
Environmental and Policy Risks 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Physical resources such as land, labour and livestock, and nonphysical resources such 
as indigenous knowledge and  institutions of producers in the grain surplus and deficit regions of 
the Central Highlands of Ethiopia are examined under situation of environmental and policy 
risks. Frequency distribution and comparative statistical analysis of the grain-surplus regions  
suggest that in situations where all producers are subjected to a common source of risk (e.g. 
rainfall): I) institutional resources become less effective, and ii) combination of land, labour, 
knowledge and other complementary resources form the basis for adjustment mechanisms and 
sequential or strategic decisions. On the other hand, when essential resources such as land are 
government owned and household decisions are shared by the state, local institutions or social 
networks become an effective means to maintain reproduction of the farm and producers through 
providing access to or sharing of resources.  
 
 In the extreme case of environmental degradation (e.g., drought), farmers follow 
sequential decision-making. This sequence of decision-making begins with minimization of 
expenditure, selling of resources that are intended to stabilize farm income, selling of resources 
essential to farming and depletion of household items, and finally evacuation. The ability of such 
farming system to regenerate, however, greatly depends not only on the availability of physical 
resources but most importantly by the potential of knowledge and institutions of producers to 
adjust to environmental changes, and support from governmental or non-governmental sources. 
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The Contribution of Non-Physical Resources and Strategic Household Decision-making to 
Environmental and Policy Risks 
 
Introduction 
 
 The major cause of environmental or resource degradation is human activity. This 
activity is greatly influenced by inappropriate government policies and increases in human 
population. These factors coupled with climatic variability have contributed to severe and 
sometimes irreversible loss of resources, including humans in less developed countries (LDCs).   
 Development experts have argued that sustainability of the environment can be 
insured by targeting strategies to minimize the misuse of resources and ameliorate the effects of 
inappropriate government policies. Strategies that were implemented in  this respect include 
projects to increase food production because poverty and malnutrition are considered to be 
factors contributing to resource degradation. Other strategies involve subsidies, grants, 
preferential loans and bilateral agreements to relax stringent policies (Wilber, 1988; Schultz, 
1978, 1980; Hyden, 1986). Nonetheless,  projects that were intended to increase food production 
have resulted in I) unequal distribution of wealth,  ii) changes in social organization within a 
society, iii) eviction of small holders, iv) psychological damages by moving people to different 
agro-ecological system, and  v) disturbed the agro-ecological balance (Chambers, 1983; Hyden, 
1986; Richards, 1985).  It is only recently that a multidisciplinary approach was adopted in the 
design, implementation and assessment of development projects (Shaner et al. 1982; 
Dommen,1988; Richards, 1985; Warren et al.  1989). 
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 Adoption of multidisciplinary approach as a paradigm  may be challenged for reasons 
such as cost-effectiveness, and requirements of  an in-depth knowledge regarding the social, 
economic, cultural and environmental constraints facing the poor in LDCs. Most importantly, 
however, the present study argues that the definition of resource as utilized by development 
projects includes only those with physical attributes.  Such a definition can be viewed as narrow, 
and precludes the involvement of non-physical or social scientists in the evolution of practical 
approaches to the design of environmentally sustainable development. 
 The study in Ethiopia adopts a more general definition of resource. Misuse of 
resources, environmental variability and inappropriate government policies are ubiquitous in 
LDCs. Underlying these conditions, the study examines two issues. Firstly, the study investigates 
the importance of non-physical resources when I) rainfall and availability of resources are 
uncertain, and  ii) producers are confronted with inappropriate government policies. Secondly, 
the study examines the manner in which households respond to drought caused by inadequate 
rainfall, shortages of physical resources and inappropriate government policies.  
 
 
 
The Problem 
 Several studies define resource as an entity that is characterized by its physical 
attributes (Tietenberg, 1988; Stevenson, 1991). The present study departs from these studies 
because it relies on the following comprehensive working definition of resource:  
" a source of supply, wealth, information or expertise, and ability to meet and handle a 
situation."(Webster's college dictionary, 1991). 
 
According to this definition, resource refer not only to objects with physical but also with non-
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physical attributes. Examples of such resources that are examined in this study include 
indigenous knowledge (IK) and institutions. 
 Knowledge is the entire collection of meaningful-action oriented experience. IK 
exhibits a sigmoid curve with increases in age, holding other factors such as schooling constant. 
This knowledge is often referred as "cultural traditions" because it co-evolved with the local 
environment. While knowledge can be individuated, it also has a social character. Hence, one 
can argue that IK is a social wealth, especially in organic societies (Weber, 1947; Durkheim, 
1947).1 
 Experience is endless, so does is knowledge. As new ways of doing or undoing things 
emerge, the old way is partly or totally replaced. The dynamics of adjustment in culture, farming, 
and agro-ecological environment lies within IK. IK is always in dynamic [dis]equilibrium with 
the environment and influenced by interventions from within and outside. 
 Food production is possible through "rational" combination of knowledge, physical, 
institutional and environmental factors. The processes of combining these factors determine the 
chances of reproduction of the farming unit and producers. While mis-use of physical resources 
is identified as the major cause of environmental degradation, the importance of knowledge and 
other non-physical resources to ensure stability of the eco-system is not investigated in detail 
(Hardin and Baden, 1977; Warren et al. 1988, pp.107; WCED, 1987).   
 As differences in access to resource endowment reflect standard of living of a nation, 
                                                     
1      Organic societies are characterized by very close interpersonal relationship among extended 
family members, and where societal values and benefits take precedence over that of individuals; 
in mechanical societies, on the other hand, human bondage is very loose and individual values 
are the driving forces of the system (See Durkheim, 1947).  
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differential access to knowledge contributes to differences in the processes and consequences of 
household decision-making. These differences are reflected by the ability of producers to survive 
under harsh environments and levels of production realized.  
        Farmers comprise the majority of the population of LDCs. They depend on a system of 
extended families and institutions to seek for help when there is a need. They are able to 
maintain autonomy through the dynamics of what Hyden called "exit" option (Hyden, 1986). 
These options help producers escape efforts of the state to impose policies on the system.  
 The carrying capacity of the eco-system declines with losses of not only physical but 
also non-physical resources (e.g. knowledge and institutions). When people are moved to a 
different location, exposed to different production system, environmental regimes ( e.g., rainfall 
and growing conditions), marketing and consumption techniques, and government intervention, 
the capacity of knowledge and institutions to enable food production may decline.2 To attain 
sustainable development, therefore, investment should give equal emphasis to both physical (e.g. 
land) and non-physical resources (Berry, 1988). 
 Several studies have examined the response of producers to new intervention 
strategies and their consequences under normal agro-ecological situations (Hayami and Ruttan, 
1985; Stevens, 1988; Wharton et al. 1969). Once a farming system is hit by environmental crises 
(e.g., drought), the ability of producers to respond wisely deteriorates.  
 
                                                     
2      When farmers fail to make independent decisions, their knowledge will lose its functional 
power. This may probably lead to severe cognitive consequences. Such cases are observed in 
situations where farmers are forced to resettle in different agro-ecological zones or become 
refugees (Mazur, 1987). 
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 The literature on adjustment mechanisms to resource degradation and patterns of 
decision-making under situations of environmental and policy risks in Ethiopia is scarce. The 
objectives of this study are to examine the importance of non-physical resources under situation 
of environmental and policy risks and provide empirical evidence on strategic decision-making 
processes that households follow in periods of drought.  
 
Design of the Study and Methods of Analysis 
 Two studies were carried out in the central Ethiopian highlands. The first study was 
conducted in 1986/87 in the grain deficit districts of Ankober and Seladengay in northern Shoa, 
Ethiopia. The second study was carried out in 1990/91 in the grain surplus regions of Ada and 
Selale, northern and eastern Shoa province, Ethiopia. The study sites belong to the cereal-
livestock or mixed farming system zone.  
 Selale is representative of the high altitude zone (more than 2000 meters above sea 
level) of the country. Ada represents the country's large middle-altitude cropping zone (1500 to 
2000 meters above sea level). The major crops grown in these areas include oat, teff,  barley, 
wheat, chickpeas, horse beans and field peas. The average farm size is 3.1 and 2.6 hectares for 
Selale and Ada regions respectively (FINNIDA, 1989). Most households in the Selale region 
belong to the Oromo ethnic group, while that of Ada farmers to the Amhara and Oromo ethnic 
groups (Gryseels and Anderson, 1983; Belay, 1977). Farmers in the Selale region specialize in 
livestock production while Ada farmers concentrate in crop production.  A sample of 217 and 54 
farmers from Selale and Ada regions were systematically selected as a part of larger study (see 
Kebede, 1993). Frequency and percentage analysis of responses to open-ended questions were 
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performed to examine the importance of non-physical resources.3 
 Seladengay is located at an altitude of more than 2000 meters above sea level while 
Ankober includes low-lying areas located at about 1800 meters above sea level. The major crops 
grown include maize, wheat, teff, sorghum, beans, peas, chickpeas and barley. The average farm 
size in Ankober and Selale regions is  1.03 and 1.25 hectares respectively (see Kebede, 1988). A 
sample of 80 farmers were randomly selected from drought affected areas of Seladengay and 
Ankober Districts of Northern Shoa province.  
 
Methods of Analysis 
 
The present study uses multidisciplinary research tools to examine the role of non-physical 
resources in the design of intervention strategies and analyze strategic decision-making 
processes in light of environmental and policy risk. These tools include anthropological 
(participatory, observatory, group discussions and open ended questionnaire), cognitive 
psychology (problems solving tests or elicitation of causal attribution) and agricultural 
economics (sequential decision-making). The use of these tools is expected to provide important 
evidence on the nature of decision-making processes in grain surplus and deficit regions in the 
presence of environmental and policy risks. 
 Observatory-participatory, group discussions and open ended questionnaire were used 
to obtain information on goals of resource allocation strategies and adjustment techniques or 
                                                     
3      To assess and measure indigenous production knowledge, problem solving tests were 
administered. The tests were intended to examine the kinds of solutions households provide to 
crop and livestock production problems (see Kebede, 1993). 
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mechanisms.  
 It has been pointed out that producers follow sequential decision-making process to 
the recurrent crises in the Ethiopian highlands (ILCA, 1986). The reaction length could be short 
or long depending on the amount of wealth or asset holdings and related socioeconomic 
characteristics of households. This study hypothesizes that decision-making patterns are 
sequential (see also Feder et al. 1985; W.Mariam, 1984). The sequential decision-making 
process follows the sell out or eating of the final food stock, seed, different class of livestock and 
assets before evacuation. Each time an asset is sold it is used to buy grain and its value will 
influence  future decisions. Data regarding cropping patterns under situations of rainfall 
variability, household characteristic, sequential depletion of assets were gathered. 
 The statistical model to examine sequential depletion of assets in response to drought 
could be specified as structural equation which can be ordered in such a way that the first 
equation include only predetermined variables. The successive equations will include 
predetermined and endogenous variables as regressors. It is assumed that the residuals of the 
successive equations are uncorrelated. That is, they have zero mean and unit variance. The 
model is given as:  
                                    m             n 
   Yjm = α0 +  ∑ βXjki + ∑ΘYm-1 + Uj 
                                  i=1           m=1 
 
      for i= 1…4, and m=1...7  
where Y's are endogenous and X's are exogenous or pre-determined variables, α is the intercept 
term, β and Θ  are unknown parameters and  U's are error terms. Various formulations of 
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sequential decision-making process were carried out and the following variables were selected.4 
 The exogenous variables include age of head of household, family size, education 
(years), and asset at times marriage (the value of crop and livestock at market price). The 
endogenous variables were grain at times of drought (in kilograms), sale of sheep, goat, draft 
animals (donkey, mule and horse), steer/heifer, cow, an ox and household equipment and assets. 
Sale or livestock and household assets were measured by their market price.  
   
Empirical Results  
Strategic Decision-Making and Environmental Variability in Grain-Surplus Region 
 
 Households in the Ethiopian highlands make use of physical resources, indigenous 
knowledge and institutions to minimize the adverse effects of environmental degradation. The 
degree with which households minimize these effects differ because knowledge varies by sex, 
age, ethnic group and degree of contact with the outside world (Warren et al. 1988).  
  Selale and Ada farmers who are closely affiliated with government institutions 
receive higher scores in production and marketing knowledge than farmers who are not (Kebede, 
1993a). Production knowledge increases with the number of years of farming experience and it is 
locale-specific. Furthermore, marketing knowledge is relatively high among farmers living 
closer to big cites (e.g. Ada). These variations in knowledge imply that the ability of households 
to respond to changes in the physical and socio-economic environment is different (Table 1). 
 
                                                     
4      Because of high degree of correlation between variables, backward and forward regressions 
were employed to identify variables with less correlation (<0.6) and yet important in influencing 
particular decisions. 
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Table 1. Responses to Questions Related to Goals of Resource 
  
Allocation 
Strategies 
Strategies Selale    Ada  
1. When Rainfall is uncertain      
a. Reduce expense and increase Saving 51 46 
b. Sell ruminants/cattle 29 15 
c. Reduce consumption        12 12 
d. Sell household valuables 8 26 
2. Future livestock feed is less, thus      
a. Reduce livestock 37 79 
b. Use hay,straw and reduce arable land 55 11 
c.Purchase feed 8 10 
3. > one crop because of     
a. Pest problems, market Value, Rainfall, family 
food requriemnt 83 97 
c. Others 17 3 
4. > 1 livestock class because of     
a. Traction need and milk production 37 58 
b. Traction, milk, meat & transport  55 37 
c. Others 9 5 
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 Failure to secure subsistence food requirements is  manifested by switch from the 
common to specialized knowledge involving strategic or sequential decision-making. Among 
farmers of Selale and Ada regions, this pattern starts with reducing expenses, selling livestock, 
search for off-farm work such as trade and wage labour, reducing consumption and selling of 
household valuables (Table 1). The last two strategies, however, signify a point-of-no-return 
(e.g. drought). 
 Overgrazing of the unmanaged commons has increased with increases in population 
and villagization.5 Scarcity of the common grazing lands and excessive use of stubble 
accelerated depletion of soil fertility. When environmental degradation threatens survival, 
households receive very little help from social networks or the government. Households, 
therefore, depend on strategic management of resources to secure subsistence food requirements. 
This takes the form of planting several crops, raising more than one class of livestock and search 
for alternative sources of animal feed (Table 1). 
 Other forms of decision-making or switching from common to private knowledge 
involve the implementation of adjustment techniques (Jodha and Mascarenhas, 1983). This is 
accomplished through re-arrangement of resources, management style and making use of social-
networks as a last resort. The choice of adjustment mechanisms are influenced by the expectation  
of rainfall and stock of resources (Table 2).  When rainfall is uncertain, i) few plots are planted  
on low moisture retaining plots (low-land), ii) most crops are planted on high moisture retaining 
                                                     
5      Villagization refers to government programs that forced farmers living in villages of around 
400 hectares in pseudo-cities close to schools or roads. This program was abandoned in 1990-91. 
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Table 2. Strategic Management or Adjustment Techniques 
 ADA Selale 
 When Expectation of Rain is: 
Adjustment Technique  Certain  Uncertain Certain   Uncertain 
Low lying plots       5 3        3 2 
High lying plots      3 6 3 3 
Harvested green       3 5 3 2 
No. of plots from which weeds are collected 3 6 4 3 
Plots from which mature crops are harvested 6 3 4 3 
Plots weeded >1       3 5 2 3 
Plots planted >1      3 3 3 2 
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plots (upland), iii) green or immature crops are harvested for livestock feed from large number of 
plots, iv) weeds are collected from many plots to reduce moisture competition and  v) several 
weeding and re-plantings are performed to secure subsistence (Table 2). 
 
Institution: A Resource and Switch-Board 
 The extent with which institutions serve their members differ depending on the mode 
of organization and influence from the outside world (e.g. policies). Farmers of the Ethiopian 
highlands were organized into private peasant associations, service and producers cooperatives 
between 1975-1990. Cooperatives were given large subsidies and benefit packages compared to 
private farmers.6  Land ownership and marketing knowledge of members of cooperatives was 
found greater among private individual farmers (Table 3).  
 Members of cooperatives tend to engage more in distributive type of social networks 
than in credit or insurance. Despite obtaining large farm size and subsidies to minimize farm 
income risk, however, land under cooperatives was less protected from erosion and overgrazing 
compared with land operated by private farmers (Belete, 1989). 
 Environmental degradation and mis-use of resources results in crop failures. When 
crops fail, households utilize various alternatives to receive support and design ways of sharing 
resources (Table 4). In  situations where crops fail, the commons (e.g. institutions) become less 
effective because all households are equally affected and the commons lack the capacity to  
                                                     
6     Socialist cooperatives were formed to attain the objective of transforming peasants into a 
working class. However, advocates of the commons argue that managed commons (e.g. 
cooperatives) are needed to internalize risks or rents of mis-use of resources and avoid tragedy 
(Andelson, 1991). 
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Table 3. Access to Land, Labour and Knowledge 
  Peasant Associations Cooperatives 
  Selale Ada  Selale Ada  
Parameter Average values per household 
Land(hectare) 2.9 2 3.1 2.5
Labourfor farming(man days) 168 194 130 149
Production Knowledge1/    7.1 7.5 6.2 6.9
Marketing Knowledge  7.2 8.1 7.5 8.4
Labour for social group:  Distributive 105 73 167 140
                         Credit 93 98 68 76
Sample Size  180 50 55 30
 
 
Table 4. Adjustment Mechanisms When Households are Exposed 
    to Common Sources of Risk 
  Selale Ada 
  
Normal 
Crop Year Crop Failure 
Normal Crop 
Year Crop Failure 
Mechanisms Percentage of farmers 
Sharing resources with:         
Friends 3 2 4 1 
Relatives 5 6 3 2 
Social networks   18 7 17 6 
Own family 74 85 76 91 
Assistance from:         
Government 5 15 12 21 
Networks 15 5 10 1 
Relatives 10 6 6 2 
Friends 5 1 3 1 
Own family 55 73 71 75 
Sample Size 195 140 51 49 
 
  14
 
provide members with adequate food supply.  
 Until 1991, Ethiopian government marketing policy required selling output to the 
government market. Households share or exchange their resources (e.g. knowledge) and make 
use of social networks to minimize losses in benefits as a result of this policy (Table 5).7 Most 
households receive assistance from social networks compared to own family. The relative 
importance of institutions or social networks is high  in a region were social relationship are 
stronger (e.g. Selale) (Table 5). 
 Ownership rights to land are the major source of uncertainty in peasant agriculture. 
Households in Ethiopia have access to land use rights. Similar to any public good, therefore, 
household care little to the consequences of over-exploitation or losses of fertility as long as they 
secure subsistence requirements. Similar to the findings reported in Tables 4 and 5, social 
networks and own resources (family) play significant role in sharing of resources and 
expectation of assistance when land is state owned than when it is private (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Many producers cooperatives have been dissolved by farmers in 1991. Since 1991, 
however, the service cooperatives have been reorganized in such a way as to increase benefits to 
private farmers. 
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Table 5. Adjustment Mechanisms when Marketing decisions are shared  by the government 
    Selale Ada  
  When selling of output is 
Mechanisms 
Controlle
d Free 
Controlle
d Free 
    Percentage of farmers     
Sharing resources With:         
Friends 5 6 2 1 
Relatives 15 12 3 2 
Social networks  25 10 15 5 
Own family 55 72 77 92 
Assistance from:         
Government 1 10 25 14 
Networks 60 18 52 10 
Relatives 10 5 7 3 
Friends 5 2 2 1 
Own family 24 65 14 72 
Sample size 128 146 51 49 
 
Table 6. Adjustment Mechanisms When Land is Fixed or State Owned 
    Selale Ada  
  When land is owned by the 
Mechanisms State Private State Private 
  Percentage of farmers 
Sharing resources with:  Friends 6 5 2 4 
Relatives 12 10 8 7 
Social networks 35 15 22 10 
Own family 47 70 68 79 
Own Assistance from: Government 1 9 2 15 
Networks 34 15 21 5 
Relatives 8 5 3 2 
Friends 2 1 2 1 
Own Family 55 70 72 77 
Sample Size 195 155 45 51 
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Strategic Decision-Making and Environmental Variability in Grain-Deficit Regions 
 Producers may be faced with crop failure when farming is rain-fed. In this kind of 
farming system, production, consumption and other kinds of decisions depend on expectations of  
the amount and distribution of rainfall. Based on group discussion with the study farmers, 
responses or expectations were classified into two: certain and uncertain rainfall. While there are 
other categories of expectations, these two categories of expectations greatly influence decisions 
of farmers in the study area. Expectation of crop failures lead to adjustments such as saving on 
current consumption and sale, changing cropping patterns and other strategic decisions. 
 Strategic decision-making when expectation of rainfall is inadequate can take different 
kinds of management techniques such as diversification of crop and livestock production, 
resource augmentations, intercropping, double cropping, and related crop management practices. 
Crop management practices, especially location of plots, when expectation of rainfall is certain 
and uncertain are presented in Table 7. 
 Seladengay is an area with relatively stable rainfall pattern, where as Ankober has 
variable rainfall and intermittent drought. As a result, the number of plots in the low lying areas 
when rainfall is uncertain is high for Ankober than for Seladengay (Table, 8). Low lying areas, 
depending on the soil type, conserve moisture. Seladengay area doesn't not seem to have greater 
variation in the location of plots. When rainfall is more certain, the number of plots in low or 
high lying locations in both study sites show no variabilities. Producers change cropping patterns 
based on expectation of soil moisture. If these management practices fail to provide subsistence  
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Table 7. Selected Adjustment mechanisms 
  Ankober Seladengay 
Mechanisms 
Uncertai
n Certain 
Uncertai
n Certain 
Intercropping 4 2 5 4
harvesting While Green 5 2 4 3
Soil and Water Conserv. 6 3 5 5
Planting crop with:Short Growing Season 6 2 5 4
Long Growing Season 1 3 2 5
Sale of Large Ruminants 1 0 1 0
Sale of Small Ruminants 2 1 3 1
Double Cropping 4 1 5 2
Weed More times 5 2 4 3
Sample Size 45 41 35 32
 
Table 8. Number of plots in the high and low lying area when rainfall is certain and uncertain   
  Ankober Region Seladengay Region 
  
No. of High Lying 
Plots 
No. of Low Lying 
Plots 
No. of High Lying 
Plots 
No. of Low Lying 
Plots 
Crop Type 
Uncertai
n Certain Uncertain Certain Uncertain
Certai
n 
Uncertai
n 
Certai
n 
Teff       2 3 4 3 2 2 4 4
Barley     2 3 4 4 3 3 3 4
Wheat      2 2 5 3 2 3 5 3
Bean       2 2 3 1 3 2 4 3
Peas       1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
Chick      1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
Maize      2 2 4 2 - - - -
Oat        1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3
Average   1.6 2 3.4 2.4 2 1.9 3.1 2.9
Sample 45 41 45 41 35 32 35 32
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requirements and followed by drought, households implement strategic or sequential decision-
making processes to minimize the effect of crises. 
 
 
Sequential Decision-Making and Drought 
 
 It is hypothesized that the older a farmer is the more asset and grain stock or wealth 
he/she owns. The larger the family size, the larger the consuming units, and hence the lesser the 
grain stock available as a security in case of drought. The more educated a farmer is the more 
likely she/he anticipates the severity of drought and make decisions to save on grain 
consumption and sale. Similarly, the more asset households posses at the time of marriage, the 
more likely that they will posses greater asset and grain stock at the time of drought than farmers 
who are not married or posses few assets when married. The result of this study suggest that the 
effect of most of the variables conform to the above hypotheses (Table 9).  
 The decision to sale sheep is expected to be negatively influenced by all variables. The 
reasons being that sheep are susceptible to water stress and lamb spoils quickly under warm 
temperature even when preserved using traditional techniques. As a result, the price of sheep at 
time of drought is extremely low. The choices or decision strategies are either to kill the sheep 
for home consumption or to sale and purchase food grain. The findings of this study indicate that 
asset at the time of marriage, family size and grain stock reduce the chances of selling sheep. 
However, age and education are positively correlated with this decision (Table 9).  
 The decision to sale goat is negatively influenced by all variables except by the age 
and education of households. Goats can sale for relatively higher prices because they can  
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Table 9. Results of Sequential Decision-Making to Drought 
    Sequential selling or consuming of  
  
Grain at 
time of 
Drought Sheep Goat Draft 
Steer or 
Heifer Cow Ox 
Household 
Equipments 
Intercept    3.308 3.655 -6.496 0.213 0.432 -4.999 -1.519 3.372 
             (5.89)** (6.77)** (8.46)** (2.530)* (6.23)** (7.961)** (3.690)** (6.87)** 
Age           0.957 1.24 0.229 0.45 0.048 0.053 0.035 0.041 
            (-0.18) (2.980)* (2.180)* (2.056)* (2.170)* (3.020)* (2.250)* (2.56)** 
Family Size   -1.859 -0.638 -0.207 0.008 0.115 0.133 0.007 0.361 
            (-4.09)** -0.48 -1.09 (-0.216) (3.60)** (-1.1) (3.010)* (2.63)** 
Asset at  time of  
marriage   0.09 -0.071 -0.057 -0.002 -0.001 0.034 0.002 0.001 
  (-0.36 (-2.23)* (-2.57)* (-1.97)** (-1.01) (2.140)* (4.110)** (-1.42) 
Education     1.978 0.662 0.258 0.011 0.013 0.106 0.014 0.208 
            (4.51)** (2.650)* (-1.46) (4.753)** (4.020)** (3.190)** (3.080)** (2.94)** 
Grain at beginning of 
Drought  -1.089 -0.13 0.621 -0.004 0.015 0.001 0.013 
   (-4.18)** (-1.34) (7.04)** (2.030)* (3.040)** (3.090)** (-2.01)* 
Sale  of Sheep                -0.042 -0.021 -0.009 0.009 0.003 0.013 
                                (-0.18) (4.06)** (-0.16) (2.920)* (-0.05) (-1.01) 
Sale  of Goat                    -0.045 -0.084 0.076 0.029 0.04 
                                         (3.21)** (7.630)** (2.660)* (2.310)* (-2.05)* 
Sale of Draft animals     -0.001 0.002 0.028 0.256 
     (-2.01) (2.410)* (4.56)** (-0.92 
Sale of Steer/heifer      -0.245 -0.624 0.676 
      (-5.45)** (-4.8)** (3.38)** 
Sale of Cow       -0.175 -0.136 
       (4.47)** (-4.17)** 
Sale of Ox        -0.7 
        (-4.32)** 
R2 0.89 0.9 0.84 0.91 0.97 0.89 0.95 0.98 
*and**indicatestatisticallysignificantdifferenceat1and5percentlevelrespectively. 
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withstand water stress. Households may prefer to sale and purchase food grain. If goats sell at a 
relatively higher price those who are older and educated would be more willing to sell and 
purchase grain than consuming the meat of goat at home. 
 The sale of donkey, mule and horse is expected to be positively correlated with all 
variables because they are mainly used as means of transport (Table 9). Since there are relatively 
few items to be transported at time of drought, these animals are not needed at home. On the 
other hand, people who want to evacuate may need these animals. The result suggest positive 
association of all variables with the sale of draft animals except the sale of sheep and goat. The 
higher the value of sheep and goat sold or the more the number of days the meat of these animals 
feed the family, the less the demand for money to purchase food grain. Hence, households may  
decide to wait a little longer before selling draft animals. The less the price offered to sheep and 
goat, the more likely that farmers will sale draft animals. 
 Heifer or steer are important stock to start animal husbandry. In addition, farmers 
associate cattle with their very existence. Losing cattle is, therefore, considered as losing one's 
identity. Economically, it is these class of animals that are at the root of the theory of "exchange 
entitlement" (Sen, 1984). The sale of this class of livestock represent half way in the severity of 
the drought, and these  animals don't with stand water and feed shortages. The sale of heifer and 
steer is expected to be positively correlated with education, age, and family size, but negatively 
affected by asset, grain stock and previous sale of animals. Households who are educated, older 
and support larger family size are more likely to  sale these animals rather than letting them die. 
On the other hand, the more asset and grain stock households posses, the less likely that they will 
sale heifer and steer. As expected most variables exert statistically significant influence on the 
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decision to sale steer or heifer (Table 10). Previous decisions negatively influence current 
decisions. That is, the more grain households can buy from previous sale, the less likely they will 
sale existing cattle or assets. 
  The sale of a cow and an ox represent critical stage in the life cycle of a farming system 
undergoing crisis. Among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a cow is symbolized as the 
"mother" of the farming system, of the self, and of children. That is, a cow or an ox serve as a 
source and means of food production. Therefore, the sale of these animals represent the severity 
drought and households will be ready to evacuate. The sale of these animals is expected to be 
influenced positively by all variables except by the preceding decision. Households who are 
educated, older and support large family size are more likely to anticipate the severity of the 
drought and willing to sale these animals. The result support this hypothesis (Table 10). The 
grain purchased from previous sales decisions except the sale of heifers/steer and cow is almost 
used up. Thus, previous sales encourage the sale of existing animals or stock to replace grain 
stock or extend the length of time that households can stay in their village.   
 The decision sale of household equipments and remaining assets represent the final stage 
of liquidation. Most past decisions will have little impact on current decisions because food grain 
purchased from the sale of sheep, goat, draft animals, steer and heifer is used-up. Thus, only the 
sale of cow and ox (recent decisions) are negatively and significantly associated with the 
decision to liquidate the remaining households assets. 
 Finally, it was hypothesized that producers decisions, even in a situation of 
environmental crises, are sequential or recursive. The larger the income or grain purchased from 
liquidation of assets, the more the number of days that households stay in their village, and the 
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less the need the sale or kill the next animal or household items. This hypothesis is supported in 
all the regressions. 
 
Conclusions  
 When producers are subjected to a common source of risk (e.g. rainfall) institutional 
resources become less effective and combination of physical and non-physical resources form 
the basis for adjustment mechanisms. When essential resources such as land are government 
owned and household decisions are shared by the state (e.g. marketing of grain ), local 
institutions become an effective means to maintain reproduction of the farm and producers 
through providing access to or sharing of resources. Losses of resources are the result of mis-
management or the outcome of knowledge-directed actions of decision makers and the 
infrastructure that permits these actions (i.e. institutions). 
    The result of empirical analysis of drought adjustment strategies indicate that I) 
current food stock is negatively and significantly influenced by family size, ii) as drought 
progress, decisions to sale different classes of livestock are positively influenced by age, family 
size, education, grain stock and assets, and iii) current sale of livestock is negatively influenced 
by previous sale. That is, the higher the value of livestock or asset sold, the less willing farmers 
are to sale the next class of livestock or asset. 
 Unlike previous studies in peasant economies that relay on the importance of physical 
resources as key variables contributing to increases in food production, the present study has 
demonstrated the vital role that indigenous knowledge and institutions play both in resource 
abundant and scare regions. The ability of humans to act and act wisely is shaped by knowledge 
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and experience they posses. In turn, their actions are given meaning by the institutional 
framework. Development in its broadest sense and avoidance of environmental or resource 
degradation  can be attained if non-physical resources (knowledge and institutions) are given 
appropriate consideration in the design and implementation of intervention strategies. Proper 
analysis and integration of knowledge and institutions of peasants in the planning of 
development strategies will help minimize misuse of resources, ensures increases in food 
production and minimizes the danger of environmental crises. 
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